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Objectives: Analyse content of incident reports during patient transitions in the context of care of 37 
older people, cardiology, orthopaedics and stroke. 38 
 39 
Methods: A structured search strategy identified incident reports involving patient transitions 40 
(March 2014 – August 2014, January 2015 – June 2015) within two NHS Trusts (in upper and 41 
lower quartiles of incident reports/100 admissions) in care of older people, cardiology, orthopaedics 42 
and stroke. Content analysis identified: incident classifications; active failures; latent conditions; 43 
patient/relative involvement; and evidence of individual or organisational learning. Reported harm 44 
was interpreted with reference to National Reporting and Learning System criteria. 45 
 46 
Results: A total 278 incident reports were analysed. Fourteen incident classifications were 47 
identified, with pressure ulcers the modal category (n=101; 36%) followed by falls (n=32, 12%), 48 
medication (n=31, 11%) and documentation (n=29, 10%). Half (n=139; 50%) of incident reports 49 
related to inter-unit/department/team transfers. Latent conditions were explicit in 33 (12%) reports; 50 
most frequently, these related to inadequate resources/staff and concomitant time pressures (n=13). 51 
Patient/family involvement was explicit in 61 (22%) reports. Patient well-being was explicit in 24 52 
(9%) reports. Individual and organisational learning was evident in 3% and 7% of reports 53 
respectively. Reported harm was significantly lower than coder-interpreted harm (p<0.0001).  54 
 55 
Conclusions: Incident report quality was sub-optimal for individual and organisational learning. 56 
Under-reporting level of harm suggests reporter bias, which requires reducing as much as 57 
practicable. System-level interventions are warranted to encourage use of staff reflective skills, 58 
emphasising joint ownership of incidents. Co-producing incident reports with other clinicians 59 
involved in the transition and patients/relatives could optimise organisational learning. 60 
  61 
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INTRODUCTION  62 
Patient safety incident reporting by healthcare professionals is an established process across many 63 
healthcare systems internationally. Clinician incident reports can impact positively on patient safety 64 
by driving changes in care processes and changing knowledge and attitudes.[1] Reporting of safety 65 
incidents is a key component of a systems approach to safety; however, it has been identified that 66 
clinicians tend to ‘fix and forget’ when they encounter a safety problem, rather than ‘fix and report’, 67 
which hampers the ability for organisational learning.[2] Similarly, a systematic review of the 68 
effectiveness of incident reporting systems found that out of 35 studies, none suitably demonstrated 69 
the double-loop learning required for changes to governance that would result in system learning.[3] 70 
Other well-recognised barriers to incident reporting and subsequent learning include perceived time 71 
constraints;[4 5] professional responsibilities;[5 6] lack of involvement in the system of reporting 72 
errors and rejection of bureaucracy;[7] incomplete feedback loops;[4 5] the inevitability of error[7]; 73 
and perceived seriousness of incidents.[5] Whilst avoidance of blame is an additional barrier to 74 
incident reporting,[4 7] it has also been identified that incident reports can be used to apportion 75 
blame to others.[8 9] 76 
 77 
It is recognised that incident reports alone are not an adequate measure of safety,[10] but that they 78 
should be used as an indicator for further investigation.[11 12] In turn this creates a requirement for 79 
higher quality incident reports, rather than an increased quantity that is indicative of a more positive 80 
safety culture.[13] Analyses of the content of incident reports have been relatively few and far 81 
between in the literature, despite the prevalence of incident reporting across healthcare systems. 82 
Existing analyses have tended to be descriptive, based on a single incident classification such as 83 
medication errors,[14-17] falls[18] or pressure ulcers.[19] Other studies have investigated incident 84 
reports related to patient outcomes, such as patient mortality,[20] and specific clinical areas, such as 85 
anaesthesia[21 22] or the emergency department.[23] Incident reports relating to clinical handovers 86 
have also been studied in detail in one identified study,[24] with poor, incomplete or no handover 87 
representing 74% of 334 analysed reports, and 99% of reports being assigned a rating of low harm. 88 
Notably, none of these studies reported whether, or how, the incidents were disclosed to patients. 89 
Involving patients and their families, even when limited to only incident disclosure, has been 90 
reported to have the ability to improve patient-provider relationships.[25] Moreover, disclosure of 91 
incidents is now required in the UK National Health Service (NHS) as part of a clinician’s duty of 92 
candour where incidents lead to death, or are deemed to be of severe harm, moderate harm, or 93 
prolonged psychological harm.[26]  94 
 95 
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The aim of this paper was to elucidate what clinician incident reports tell us about patient safety 96 
incidents during transfers, handovers and discharges (collectively referred to transitions) in the 97 
clinical contexts of care of older people, cardiology, orthopaedics and stroke. Specifically we aimed 98 
to identify types of transitions and theoretical constructs of safety models (active failures and latent 99 
conditions[27]) to inform changes to practice. This included the extent of individual and 100 
organisational learning, the degree of patient and family member involvement in safety incidents, 101 
and the extent that reported harm was deemed congruent with established criteria for categorisation 102 
of harm. 103 
 104 
METHODS 105 
Ethical approval for the collection and analysis of incident reports for the included NHS Trusts and 106 
wards was obtained from the Yorkshire and The Humber/Leeds West NHS Ethics Committee 107 
(13/YH/0372) as part of the PRoSOCT study.[28] R&D approval for access and use of data was 108 
provided by the individual NHS Trusts. Incident reports were anonymised by participating Trusts as 109 
part of the research governance process.  110 
 111 
Sampling frame and search strategy 112 
A structured search strategy identified all incident reports involving patient transitions during 113 
March 2014 to August 2014 and January 2015 to June 2015 from four hospitals within two NHS 114 
Trusts in 16 wards representing four clinical areas: care of older people; cardiology; orthopaedics; 115 
and stroke. Incident reports relating to transfers, handovers and discharges were identified based on 116 
pre-existing categories; ‘failure/delay of discharge’ and ‘admission/transfer problems’. This was 117 
supplemented by a keyword search of incident reports consisting of ‘discharge’, ‘transfer’, 118 
‘handover’ or ‘hand-off’. The trusts represented the upper and lower quartiles of all NHS Trusts in 119 
England based on the number of incident reports per 100 admissions. One of the Trusts had 7 120 
reports per 100 admissions; whereas the second had 3 reports per 100 admissions. 121 
 122 
Anonymised incident reports retrieved from the search strategy were transferred to an Excel sheet 123 
with the following data fields: anonymous ID number, incident description; action(s) taken, 124 
category, degree of reported harm, and clinical area (derived from hospital ward name). Root cause 125 
analyses of the incident reports were not available. 126 
 127 
Eligibility criteria 128 
Eligible incident reports had to explicitly describe any type of care process (collect, assess, plan, 129 
supplement or follow-up/monitor or evaluation[29]) as part of a patient transition (completed or 130 
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planned). A transition was defined as the movement of a patient from one location to another, which 131 
also included self-transfer (or self-discharge) by the patient. Incidents were excluded where there 132 
was no indication of a safety incident associated with a patient transition, such as an unwitnessed 133 
fall or incident reports focused on concerns about staffing levels. 134 
 135 
Data extraction and analysis 136 
A researcher (JS) became familiar with the data by reading a large proportion of the safety incidents 137 
and becoming immersed in the data, as part of the preparation phase for content analysis.[30] A data 138 
extraction form (online appendix 1) and accompanying coding manual (online appendix 2) were 139 
then developed to enhance the reliability of the data extraction and analysis process. Data extraction 140 
and coding was based on data explicitly reported in the incident report (otherwise a code of ‘none’ 141 
was recorded). 142 
 143 
The data extraction form was piloted; JS individually coded 20% of incidents, which were also 144 
independently coded by AB, ADB, EH, PD (5% each). Following the pilot, the extracted data 145 
were compared and discussed by the coders, with a particular emphasis on (dis)agreements and 146 
partial (dis)agreements. Inter-rater reliability was measured using percentage agreement and 147 
Scott’s Pi. As a result of these discussions, the data extraction form was revised to improve 148 
clarity and meaning for all variables. Data extraction was then piloted on 20 randomly selected 149 
incident reports by two coders (JS and DF) working independently, with percentage agreement of 150 
>90%. Further refinements were then made to the data extraction form and coding manual. Inter-151 
rater reliability testing results are available in online appendix 3. The final data extraction form 152 
captured the following variables:  153 
• Type of transition (informed by definitions developed by Pezzolesi and colleagues)[24] 154 
• Reason for transition  155 
• Incident classification  156 
• Active failures[30] 157 
• Latent conditions[30] 158 
• Staff actions 159 
• Role of reporter in incident 160 
• Patient/family involvement 161 
• Patient well-being 162 
• Evidence of individual learning 163 
• Evidence of organisational/systems learning  164 
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• Concordance between level of harm reported in the incident and the coder’s interpretation 165 
(based on National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) definitions of harm[31]  166 
• Coder’s reflections on the incident 167 
 168 
DF then coded the remaining incident reports, with any case reports identified as ineligible 169 
confirmed by a second coder (JS).  170 
 171 
Microsoft Excel was used to file and code qualitative data. Initial coding of incident classification, 172 
active failures, latent conditions and free text responses of the coder’s reflections on specific 173 
incident classifications were content analysed for manifest content.[30] Each incident report was 174 
treated as a single unit of data due to a tendency for the individual completing the incident report to 175 
conflate the two types of data, thus producing a single account.  176 
 177 
IBM SPSS Statistics version 24 was used to generate appropriate descriptive statistics for all 178 
variables, including conducting a Chi-square test to establish associations between observed levels 179 
of harm and interpreted harm within incident reports.  180 
 181 
RESULTS 182 
A total of 375 incident reports were identified by the search strategy. Ninety seven were excluded 183 
for reasons such as not being related to a patient safety related transition (online appendix 4), with 184 
278 included in the analyses (Figure 1). This meant that 2.5% of the 11,282 patient discharges 185 
during the study period had an incident report that met the inclusion criteria.  186 
 187 
[Insert figure 1 around here] 188 
 189 
Fourteen incident classifications were identified across the dataset overall (Table 1). The modal 190 
incident classification was pressure ulcers (n=101, 36%), followed (in descending frequency) by 191 
falls (n=32, 12%); medication (n=31, 11%); documentation (n=29, 10%); delayed transition (n=15, 192 
5%); communication (n=15, 5%); device / equipment (n=12, 4%); infection control (n=11, 4%); 193 
potentially unsafe transition (n=11, 4%); patient self-transfer (n=10, 4%); staff related issues (n=4, 194 
2%); sub-optimal treatment (n=4, 2%); patient injury, (n=2, 1%); and patient violence (n=1, <1%).  195 
 196 
Pressure ulcers was the dominant incident classification across all four clinical areas, followed by 197 
medication (care of older people and cardiology), documentation (orthopaedics) and falls (stroke) 198 
(online appendix 5). Table 2 shows the cross-tabulation of incident classifications with active 199 
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failures, including exemplar quotes from actual incident reports. Incidents related to medication had 200 
the greatest number of unique active failures (n=11), with the number of active failures broadly 201 
equating to frequency of incident classifications. 202 
 203 
[Insert tables 1 and 2 around here] 204 
 205 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for a cross tabulation of type of transition and incident 206 
classifications (and codes) for the dataset overall. Half of all incident reports were inter-207 
unit/department/team transfers (n=139, 50%), followed (in descending frequency) by discharges/out 208 
of hospital transfers; intra-unit/department/team transfers; and hospital to hospital transfers (Table 209 
1).  210 
 211 
The rank order of the three most frequently reported transition types for the dataset overall was 212 
identical for the care of older people, cardiology and orthopaedics (inter-unit/dept/team, out of 213 
hospital, intra-unit/dept/team). For incidents from stroke care, inter-unit/dept/team transitions were 214 
more frequently reported, and intra-unit/department/team and out of hospital were ranked 2nd and 215 
3rd respectively (online appendix 6). The transition type ‘Into hospital’ was present in reports from 216 
three of the four clinical specialisms - care of older people, cardiology and orthopaedics. Patient 217 
self-transfers were only reported for two clinical specialisms - cardiology and orthopaedics. In one 218 
incident report for orthopaedics the transition type was unknown.  219 
 220 
Latent conditions, patient/family involvement, patient well-being and learning  221 
A cross-tabulation of incident classifications with latent conditions, patient/family involvement, 222 
patient well-being and learning is presented in Table 3.  223 
 224 
Information pertaining to nine different latent conditions was present in 33/278 (12%) of incident 225 
reports: inadequate resources/staff and related time pressures (n=13); pressures for bed space (n=6); 226 
competing demands of wards (n=3); staff unaware of policy/procedures (n=3); staff inexperience 227 
(n=2); local policy/workflow procedures (n=2); inadequate equipment (n=1); ward design (n=2); 228 
and over-ruled by management (n=1). Incident classifications with the highest proportion 229 
(percentage) of explicit references to latent conditions were staff-related issues, delayed transition 230 
and infection control.  231 
 232 
Patient or family involvement was identified in 61/278 (22%) incident reports; although this was 233 
typically superficial and passive, such as ‘patient or family member informed or given advice’. The 234 
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incident classifications with the highest proportion of explicit references to patient or family 235 
involvement were staff-related issues, patient self-transfers and delayed transitions. Evidence of 236 
directly addressing patient well-being was identified in 24/278 (9%) reports (primarily for 237 
medication errors and staff-related issues that prevented timely provision of care), with statements 238 
such as ‘apology given to patient or family member’. The greatest proportion of incidents with 239 
evidence of addressing patient well-being was for staff-related issues (3/4 = 75%); for example a 240 
case involving an unexpected patient transfer (inter-unit/dept/team) in the care of older people, 241 
where the patient felt unsafe due to receiving staff being ‘very unwelcoming’ – “Our member of 242 
staff stayed with the patient until a mattress had been found and tried to reassure her she would be 243 
safe on the ward” 244 
 245 
Individual learning was evident in only 7/278 (3%) incident reports. Nine (3%) incident reports 246 
made reference to organisational learning: discussed with staff/other senior team members (n=7); 247 
and root cause analysis (n=2). Only one incident report included explicit evidence of double-loop 248 
learning (both individual and organisational learning).  249 
 250 
[Insert table 3 around here] 251 
 252 
Concordance between reported and interpreted harm 253 
A chi-square test indicated there was a significant difference between levels of harm reported within 254 
incident reports and the coder’s (DF) interpretation (Figure 2; χ2 [9] = 216.5, p < 0.0001). Overall, 255 
116/278 (42%) cases of reported harm were re-graded by the coder, with 114/116 (98%) of these 256 
being re-graded to a higher level of harm. 257 
  258 
[Insert figure 2 around here] 259 
 260 
Examples from incident reports that illustrate the discordance between observed and interpreted 261 
harm related to pressure ulcers; the following examples were designated as no harm: 262 
 263 
“Patient was admitted into hospital with a grade 3 pressure sore to her sacrum, 264 
onto [ward name] patient then transfered [sic] to [ward name] on [date] with a 265 
fractured hip” [Incident report 154] 266 
 267 
“Found to have Cat 3 pressure ulcer on coccyx 2cm x1.5cm. Discharged home with 268 
presure [sic] relieving equipment” [Incident report 339] 269 




The aim of this paper was to elucidate what clinician incident reports tell us about patient safety 272 
incidents during transitions in the clinical context of care of older people, cardiology, orthopaedics 273 
and stroke. The majority (69%) of incidents in our dataset related to pressure ulcers, falls, 274 
medication and documentation errors; these categories generally reflect studies that have 275 
investigated single incident classifications,[14-19] but no known study has previously observed the 276 
prevalence of these incidents in relation to transitions in care. Half (50%) of incidents involved 277 
inter-unit/department/team transfers, closely matching the 51% of incident reports previously 278 
identified in relation to patient handovers.[24] Aggregate level analyses revealed that the vast 279 
majority of incident reports involving patient transitions were of poor quality; they tended to focus 280 
on identifying the presence of an incident, and to a lesser extent explaining the contributory active 281 
failures. Only 12% made any explicit references to latent conditions that could help to elucidate the 282 
factors associated with the why and how, which are necessary to inform learning and design of 283 
preventative strategies. This low proportion of contributory factors has also been described in 284 
analyses of incident reports in the context of primary care.[33] 285 
 286 
There was also paucity of explicit references to individual and organisation learning, with only one 287 
incident report containing evidence of double-loop learning needed to drive changes to governance 288 
that would result in system learning.[3] The dearth of individual and organisational learning is a 289 
particularly crucial finding as the importance of local learning has recently been recognised.[31] 290 
However our findings appear to suggest that incident reporters are either not utilising their reflective 291 
skills, or are reporting to apportion or deflect blame. For instance, staff may be adopting a ‘fix and 292 
forget’ as opposed to ‘fix and report’ philosophy,[6] which could moderate their motivation (and 293 
behaviour) to provide a more comprehensive incident report. Another explanation may be that staff 294 
or are using the incident reports for purposes other than learning. Building on previous work where 295 
culture was deemed to be a barrier to incident reporting,[4] analyses in the current study suggest 296 
that incident reports were primarily used as a vehicle to defend receiving staff and organisations by 297 
assigning responsibility to senders (out of hospital, hospital to hospital, inter-unit/department/team 298 
and into hospital) or to patients (intra-unit/department team and self-transfer). Previous research has 299 
identified that clinicians can use incident reporting to protect professional identity,[34,35] and to 300 
deflect blame for incidents.[8 9] 301 
 302 
Explicit references to patient/family involvement and directly addressing patient well-being were 303 
infrequent within reports (22% and 9% respectively). Involvement in the current analysis was 304 
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typically passive with few details included in reports of how disclosure was addressed, though it is 305 
acknowledged that the majority of data was collected prior to the implementation of a duty of 306 
candour.[26] Despite this, the widespread under-reporting of the levels of harm, which concurs with 307 
previous research,[24]  has implications for future disclosure of harm, where duty of candour is 308 
unlikely to be adhered to because incidents were incorrectly recorded as no or low harm. This 309 
discordance between reported and coder interpreted harm are suggestive of reliability and validity 310 
issues of NRLS criteria in the context of patient transitions, or might be a further example of 311 
defensive reporting. Actively engaging patients and their families in reporting safety incidents[32-312 
35] is one such way of improving involvement. However, our analysis indicates that there is also a 313 
need to consider wider disclosure of incidents, not just those resulting in death or deemed to be of 314 
severe harm, moderate harm, or prolonged psychological harm, as required by the duty of candour 315 
in the UK NHS.[26] The disclosure of lower levels of harm could ensure that patients and/or family 316 
are more involved in their healthcare and may be active participants in their own safety,[36] taking 317 
additional responsibility for their safety.[37] Co-production of incident reports could also facilitate 318 
deeper learning on contributory factors to the types of incidents identified in this study.  319 
 320 
Self-transfer was included as a safety incident following NRLS coding criteria.[36] In some 321 
circumstances it may be debateable as to whether this constitutes a safety incident. It can be argued 322 
that patients are making a preference- and value-based decision to leave hospital. For instance, one 323 
patient self-discharged after seeing his notes and that medical staff did not consider that his 324 
symptoms were indicative of epilepsy, thus making the test redundant, leading to a possible 325 
perception of futility of remaining in hospital. Reported harm in terms of NRLS criteria was 326 
discordant with coder interpreted harm, particularly for pressure ulcers. There was evidence of 327 
over-reporting of no harm, and under-reporting of both low and moderate harm. This may be 328 
explained as a consequence of staff not receiving adequate training on incident reporting. As 329 
suggested previously, it may be that staff who report incidents to deflect blame do not want to draw 330 
attention to the incident, or alternatively they may believe that ‘ownership’ of the harm does not 331 
belong to them. Regardless, harm has occurred to the patient, and should be reported as such.  332 
 333 
Implications for practice  334 
Incident reporting is based on a safety science approach that requires the identification of incidents 335 
to inform organisational learning and intervention development.[27] Incident reports are often used 336 
to trigger a more in-depth analysis of the reported safety incident, such as through Root Cause 337 
Analysis (RCA), or to identify trends and patterns across all reported incidents. However under-338 
reporting the level of harm and the use of incident reports as defensive practice, as identified in this 339 
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study, supports the notion that reporter bias is an inherent feature of incident reporting.[10] These 340 
limitations have important implications for practice. Firstly, under-reporting the level of harm may 341 
influence whether a RCA is conducted or not, and biases around defensive reporting may continue 342 
through into the RCA. This is particularly problematic when RCAs are identified to be at risk of 343 
political hijack amongst other issues.[38] Secondly, there is an increasing focus on the use of 344 
machine learning to derive meaning from large datasets within healthcare, often referred to as ‘big 345 
data’.[39] Organisational and especially national incident report systems can generate this big data, 346 
and there is an increasing amount of research exploring the use of machine learning to analyse 347 
incident reports.[40-43] However, machine learning is unable to account for these biases as they are 348 
not yet fully understood and are arguably fluid in nature. Therefore the adage of ‘garbage in, 349 
garbage out’ that is used in relation to data quality[44] applies to the use of machine learning for 350 
incident reports. Recognising and describing the biases that occur in incident reporting is therefore a 351 
requirement for addressing their causes and tackling the relevant organisational cultures and 352 
structures that result in defensive reporting and under-reporting of harm.  353 
 354 
A further implication for practice is that single incident reports may not be appropriate for patient 355 
transitions due to ‘ownership’ of the incident representing a grey area. The incident reporter may be 356 
unaware of the precise nature and range of active failures or latent conditions contributing to the 357 
safety incident prior to the patient arriving in their care, including the disposition of the patient prior 358 
to, and after transfer/discharge from their care. A lack of clarity around ownership and 359 
accountability may, in part, account for the infrequent reporting of latent conditions, individual and 360 
organisational learning, including under-reporting of harm in a patient transition context. For 361 
example, a pressure ulcer that originated on another ward, hospital or community may lead to a dis-362 
ownership of the incident with some staff reporting this as no harm (as the harm did not occur in the 363 
receiver’s care), despite the patient actually experiencing harm. As a result of assigning 364 
responsibility for the incident to its origin there is a concomitant reduced likelihood of engaging in 365 
reflective practices and initiating procedures to trigger systems learning. This external attribution of 366 
responsibility is particularly damaging as the transition incident may not have been identified or 367 
reported where the individual’s pressure ulcer originated; thus nowhere in the system is the incident 368 
or any harm recorded. Changes to existing training on why and how to complete incident report in 369 
relation to these grey areas could help to improve the quality of incident reports. Incident reporting, 370 
particularly in relation to transitions in care, should therefore not be conducted in isolation. Instead, 371 
the social nature of healthcare delivery needs to be recognised and co-ordinated action should be 372 
taken. A transition incident report that is co-produced with patients/relatives and staff from both the 373 
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sending and receiving team may help to remove this grey area and improve the quality of incident 374 
reports related to transitions, particularly by reducing bias through triangulation. 375 
 376 
Limitations 377 
The reliability of the data collection process and analysis was augmented by use of a structured data 378 
extraction form and detailed coding manual. The inter-rater reliability of the data extraction form 379 
was more than satisfactory; although subsequent coding of incident reports was predominately 380 
undertaken by one author (DF). Therefore, it is likely there are some subjective interpretations of 381 
the information within reports. Furthermore, omission of some fields of the incident reports as part 382 
of the research governance process may have impacted on the analyses; for example, information 383 
on who compiled the incident report was excluded but may have had relevance, as it has been 384 
reported that seniority influences perception of severity of harm.[45] Incident reports were also 385 
derived from discrete 6-month periods as opposed to continuous months, which prohibited the 386 
impact of any underlying time trend or seasonality (using time series analysis) on frequency and 387 
content of reports to be established. Finally, due to variability in numbers of transitions in each 388 
clinical area and inherent differences in case-mix, any meaningful comparisons between specialisms 389 
in terms of type of incident classification was prohibited.   390 
 391 
Further research  392 
Increased numbers of incident reports, whilst an indicator of a positive safety culture, is an invalid 393 
measure of the safety climate. In order to ensure favourable cultural conditions for safety, system-394 
level interventions are warranted that convey the value of incident reporting for the benefit of 395 
patients and quality of care, which capitalise on the reflective skills of practitioners. The potential to 396 
make an active error is highest in the sending team, whereas the potential to discover an error is 397 
highest in the receiving team. Therefore, development of patient transition incident reports 398 
constructed by sending and receiving teams (whether inter- or intra-hospital) are warranted for 399 
reducing the prevalence of defensive reporting, and enhancing a sense of joint ownership of 400 
incidents. The latter would benefit from the inclusion of the patient’s/relatives’ narrative, and there 401 
is a pressing need to develop protocols for co-production of incident reports in collaboration with 402 
patients and relatives. Furthermore, the large under-reporting of harm was a concern. Further 403 
research with staff that under-report levels of harm is needed to identify and address this issue. 404 
 405 
Conclusions 406 
Whilst there were 14 incident classifications identified, nearly 70% of incident reports were in 407 
relation to pressure ulcers, falls, medication and documentation errors, suggesting these are the 408 
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greatest challenges in providing safe care to patients undergoing a transition in care. Incident 409 
reports related to patient transitions were primarily used as a defence mechanism to apportion blame 410 
to other teams or units, or even to patients. The quality of incident reports was sub-optimal for 411 
individual and organisational learning, and levels of harm appeared to be frequently under-reported. 412 
This means it is unlikely that clinicians’ duty of candour - requiring disclosure of incidents resulting 413 
in moderate or greater harm, or prolonged psychological harm - is being adhered to. There is a need 414 
to improve the process of incident reporting to reduce cultural barriers, and to improve the quality 415 
of incident reports, including the reduction of bias as much as practicable. For incidents relating to 416 
transitions, a co-produced incident report between the sending and receiving team, including the 417 
patient and/or relatives, may improve capacity for learning and help to address the issue of bias 418 
through triangulation. 419 
 420 
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Figure and table legends 551 
Figure 1: Flowchart diagram of the process used to identify incident reports 552 
Figure 2: Clustered bar graph of reported and interpreted harm 553 
Table 1: Cross-tabulation of type of transition and incident classification 554 
Table 2: Cross-tabulation of incident classifications and active failures with exemplar quotes from 555 
incident reports 556 
Table 3: Cross-tabulation of incident classifications with latent conditions, patient/family 557 
involvement, patient well-being and learning 558 
Table 1 
Type of Transition* 
Inter-unit / 





























Skin not intact 
Moisture lesion 














































Medication not prescribed  
Medication delayed 






















































Incorrect (other patient) documentation 
Documentation error 
Delay in receipt of documentation 












































Delayed discharge (communication) 
Delayed discharge (family) 
Delayed discharge (transport) 
Delayed discharge (documentation) 


























No handover taking place 
Sub-optimal handover of information 
Referral not made 
Diagnostic tests not done/delayed 



























Device / equipment 








    
12 (4%) 
 
Equipment failure      
Infection control 
Infection control failure 













Potentially unsafe transition 




















Self-discharged without informing staff 
Self-discharged against medical advice  
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Sub-optimal levels of staff 
Patient distress arising from staff actions 
Unable to provide safe care / meet patient 
needs due to staff shortages 







































Skin tear   
2 
 




Patient violence 1       1 (<1%) 
Overall 139 (50%) 66 (24%) 41 (15%) 13 (5%) 9 (3%) 9 (3%) 1 (<1%) 278 (100%) 
 
*Types of transfer definitions: 
− Into hospital - a patient is admitted to a hospital ward from their home or in the community 
− Out of hospital - a patient is discharged home (with or without community care), or to a care home 
− Inter-unit / department / team - a patient is moved from one ward to another in the same hospital 
− Intra-unit / department / team - a patient is moved from a hospital bed to wheelchair or handover between day and night staff 
− Hospital to hospital - a patient is moved from one hospital to another, dependent on the perspective of the reporter (receiving or sending the patient) 
− Self-transfer - a patient expresses a wish to discharge themselves from hospital (irrespective of whether they followed through with it or not, and staff were informed or 
not) 
















































• Skin bundle documentation inaccurate 
• Non-adherence/lack of follow-up to treatment of 
pressure ulcer in skin bundle  
• No mention of pressure ulcer in transfer 
documents 
• No skin assessment undertaken prior to transition 
• Skin assessment not thoroughly undertaken 
• Incorrect location of pressure sore in 
documentation 
• Pressure sore graded incorrectly in documentation 
• Tissue viability nurse was not alerted 
• Pressure ulcer worsening 
• Patient transfered [sic] from [name of sending ward] to [name of receiving ward] 
found to have a stage 1 pressure sore on right buttock however skin bundle stated 
it was normal 
• Patient transfered [sic] into the care on our ward and stated on handover that skin 
was intact and has a grade 2 
• Patient was handed over to have skin intact but fragile. on skin inspection this was 
not the case, patient had- Grade 2 spine; Scab to forehead; Grade three to left calf-
sloughy; Grade 2 to left calf, scabbed.; Dry cracked skin to both heels and arms; 
Grade 2 to right forearm,  
• Nothing has been documented or handed over. No body map already in place and 
patient has been in hospital for a few days already.  





























• Inadequate moving and handling  
• Failure to use equipment available 
• Failure to check patient understood instructions 
• Information in patient notes overlooked 
• Inadequate observation / monitoring of patient 
• Fall not documented in transfer notes 









• OT and Physiotherapy joint transfer assessment. Sliding transfer from bed to chair. 
Somehow the wheelchair was pushed away. Patient fell to the floor.  
• Staff sat at nurses station having handover when heard a loud beng [sic]. when we 
stood up we saw pt on florr [sic] at doorway to bay 4. Pt had been walking out of 
bay when she fell but staff had not seen her due to board round screen blocking the 
view of bay 4 (falls bay). 
• Bank HCA C reports to me that she was supervising the patient transferring from 
bed to chair, on route to the bathroom when his legs gave way and he crumbled to 
his knees. 
• About to transfer [patient name] from the bed to a wheel chair to sit out. I had 
placed his slippers on and dropped the bed rail ready for him to move his legs out. 
I went to the end of the bed to get a zimmer frame, to assist with the transfer, when 
I turned round Mr C coughed and his legs moved and he turned and rolled out of 



















• Discharge medication prescription incomplete 
• Discharged without prescribed medication 
• Incorrect medication prescribed 
• Incorrect medication prescribed (other patient) 
• Medication not administered  
• Unsigned for controlled medication 
• Prescription illegible / unclear 
• Lost medication 
• Medication labelled incorrectly 
• The ward then checked their drug cupboard and it came to light that 1 vial (10 
grams) had gone missing so they could not make up the full 30 gram dose 
• I came onto shift onto [date] and was administering the 8am medications. Noticed 
on drug chart,22:00 medications had not been given  
• Following handover checked prescription which was very unclear. 
• When discharging patient and gathering TTOS together it was noticed that patients 




• Incorrect medication dosage in discharge notes 

















• Patient documentation not signed  
• Missing information on patient documentation 
• Required documentation not completed 
• Lost/misplaced documentation 




• Patient discharged to [name of hospital] this pm. [name of hospital] contacted 
ward at 1700 stating no notes for the patient had been received  
• Patient transferred to [name of receiving ward] from [name of sending ward], and 
found to have another patient's PPM checklist in their notes 
• When speaking to staff and reading medical notes from [name of sending ward] 
there has been no documentaion [sic] around the wound 
• No post-op instructions or post-op care written by staff from previous day when 



















• Transport failed to arrive on time  
• Ambulance personnel not willing to wait 
• Ambulance arrived with no room for nurse escort 
• Miscommunication with ambulance service 
• Miscommunication between staff about 
availability of bed 
• Poor communication with family members 
• Delay in obtaining test results 
• Take home medications not documented or signed 
off 
• The patient was made ready for transport at 10:00hrs. The patient's transport 
finally arrived at 16:30hrs. 
• Patient then turned up unannounced by hospital transport, but bed was unavailable 
• Patient should have been discharged today all TTO'S and paperwork completed, 
patient needed pacing check before discharge.  We understand the technician was 
busy and there were emergency's he had to attend to 
• Patient was ready for collection two ambulance men arrived on the ward at 18:30 
the patient had about 8 bags of property. I explained they were not going with her. 
As I was on the phone arranging for the bags to be collected the ambulance man 

















• Failed to inform at handover that patient required 
cohorting 
• Not informed at transfer about deprivation of 
liberty being in place   
• No verbal handover took place 
• No handover of patient history/symptoms# 
• Not referred for advice / treatment / follow-up 
• Miscommunication between ward staff 
• Stroke Outreach Service (SOS) had been told that her discharge was planned for 
[date]. No NOTIS referral had been made to SOS on [later date]. 
• Theatre coordinator was not aware of this patient and theatre was not booked. 
• Routine telephone call to nursing home after discharge- they report that 
recommendations were not passed over on transfer from nursing staff. 
• Patient transferred to [name of ward], with an inappropriate handover, was not 
informed that that the patient needed to be cohorted as gets confused during the 















• Sutures not removed 
• Cannula left in situ 
• Catheter left in situ 
• IVF in situ not replaced 
• IV pump running at incorrect rate 
 
 
• Patient sent home with venflon still in situ. 
• On examination it was found that patient had 2 embedded sutures still in place 
from surgery undertaken in [location of hospital] over 6 weeks ago 
• Pt found to have catheter in situ, which was full and was drained of 1,500 ml urine. 
• During bad side hand over,7.20am (approx) an IV pump with Furosemide alarmed 
to say it had finished, was not due to finish until 1pm approx, the pump display 










• Failure to implement infection control procedures  
• Poor communication at handover/transfer 
between staff  
• Sub-optimal patient isolation  
• Patient was being nursed in a closed bay due to Diarrhoea and Vomiting Outbreak. 
Phone call received from site manager over at the [name of hospital] that patient 
was to outlie on [name of receiving ward] as identified as medically stable for 



















• Sub-optimal ward cleaning 






[name of ward] where put at risk. Another patient transferred into empty bed 
space. 
• This meant that patient had been exposed to a side room environment, which had 
previously been occupied by a patient who had been very symptomatic with C 
Diff, without it being HPV 
• Patient transferred to [name of ward and date]. It was handed over that this patient 
was clear of Cdiff. [date] infection control came to ward and explained that patient 
was not clear of Cdiff and had not been made clear initially. 
• Pt transferred from [name of ward] to [name of ward] from a side room into a side 
room with active diarrhora [sic] and vomiting within the previous 48 hrs , ? why 





































• Transition without cardiac monitoring 
• Non-adherence to treatment protocols 
• Inaccurate handover of patient history 
• Failure to take into account well-being of patient 














• Staff Nurse from [name of ward] phoned, and advised that they have an admission 
coming in from [other ward name], but they prefer us admitting the patient while 
they take one of our patients instead. The patient they want is having on going 
chest pain, he was on cardiac monitor and was to have Angiogram done the 
following day at 11:00hrs. The Staff Nurse insisted on having the patient moved to 
[name of ward] that night, despite the fact that no procedure was scheduled for him 
during the night. 
• Patient transferred [sic] from Catheter Lab without monitoring. Patient previously 
had HR 22, on arrival to Recovery, pre procedure, HR 36. Nil heart monitoring on 
transfer, additionally, no nurse attended during transfer. 
• Mr J H was transferred to [name of ward] from [name of ward] on the 03/01/15 , 
Stoke Rehab, with a 1 - 1 carer and still needing Specialist Stroke Rehab, felt to be 
an inappropriate transfer and was in fact transferrred back on the 05/01/15 
• Pt handed over as being pleasantly muddled and just in hospital with increased 
confusion and was fine to go into the main ay. Explained that we had 3 pts already 
on the ward who required 1-1 care and we had no 1-1 carers. When pt arrived on 


























• Delayed diagnostic test 
• Mental health issues not addressed 










• Following a conversation with the medical team in which pt was informed that he 
was medically fit for discharge pt voiced to the Dr that he had suicidal thoughts 
and may wish to harm himself if he went home. Shortly after the conversation pt 
left the ward without informing staff and without any discharge papers or 
medication. As pt had communicated that he felt suicidal and had left the ward 
abruptly concerns were felt for his safety. 
• Patient found reading own notes and taking photos of script on phone. patient very 
unhappy about what he had read, and started to remove electrodes, tried to diffuse 
and calm patient to stay in hospital appeared shaky not angry, saying wasting his 
time in hospital if no one believes these are epileptic seizures, explained that does 
not mean he isnt having seizures. refused to listen, statement supplied regarding 



































• Poor communication between transferring & 
receiving ward staff 















• Staff transfered [sic] patient to ward and was told by staff nurse that patient was 
not expected, no hand over given and they did not have mattress for the patient. 
The receiving staff on the ward was very unwelcoming to the patient stating that 
she was not supposed to be coming to their ward. 
 
• Short staffed with x2 RN's and 1 HCA. bed manager informed an 2nd HCA sent 
to ward. Lots of confused high falls risk patients. very loud on ward all night with 
patients using call bell, patients not using call bells and just getting up, lots of 
patients unwell, short of breath chest pains ect. All staff on ward constantly 
attending patients. one patient especially noisy shouting out an wake other patients 
or making it so other patients couldn’t sleep at all, which is exacibating [sic] other 
high falls risks patient to get up and be unsettled.  
 
• Short staff- 6 members of staff working [date] Late shift. Discharging many 
patients- Discharge meds (controlled drugs) not going with the pt as ambulances 
arrive and want a quick discharge. Spending 35 minutes on the phone booking 























• Temperature probe used incorrectly  
• Patient on incorrect SLT fluid regimen  
• BM not taken according to protocol 








• Patient met discharge protocol, oral temperature being 36.3 degrees c. When 
arriving on the ward, the ward nurse failed to take an accurate reading, due to the 
fact they did not insert the probe all the way down the ear canal.  
• Pt had an unstable neck fracture and was sent to x-ray for imaging with neck collar 
in situ. On pts return to the ward she was found to have been transferred back to 
the ward without the collar on. 
• I'm not sure whether the error occurred with [sending ward name] handing over 
SLT recs or with [name of ward] receiving them but the pt was put on out of date 
SLT recommendations. 
• Patient transferred from [name of ward] after having had a lumbar puncture. it was 













• Staff failed to notice an injury had occurred 
during transfer 




• Noticed a bump and small bruise to the patient's left eyebrow, and according to the 
husband, the patient bumped her left eyebrow on the hoist while being transferred 
from wheelchair to bed, and again according to the husband, it appears that the day 
staff did not notice what she had done 
• Whilst patient being transfered [sic] off hoist sling on bed, patient suffered skin 











• Information about patient mental health and 




• Documented in the nursing notes "can become aggressive and angry very quickly 
.... this puts others at risk" information that was not handed over prior to 
transfer……………….The patient was verbally aggressive to staff immediately on 
arrival to [name of ward] she was wandering around the ward threatening to hit 













being, n (%) Individual 
learning, n (%) 
Organisational 












Pressure ulcer 101 (36%) 1 (1%) 18 (18%) 4 (4%) 1 (1%) 7 (7%) 
Falls 32 (12%) 3 (9%) 4 (13%) 2 (6%)  3 (9%) 
Medication 31 (11%) 5 (16%) 10 (32%) 8 (26%)  3 (10%) 
Documentation 29 (10%) 3 (10%) 6 (21%)  2 (7%) 1 (3%) 
Delayed transition 15 (5%) 6 (40%) 6 (40%) 2 (13%)  1 (7%) 
Communication 15 (5%) 3 (20%) 2 (13%) 2 (13%)  1 (7%) 
Device / equipment 12 (4%) 1 (8%) 2 (16%) 1 (8%)  1 (8%) 
Infection control 11 (4%) 4 (36%)   1 (9%)  
Potentially unsafe 
transition 11 (4%) 3 (28%) 
1 (9%)  
2 (18%) 
 
Patient self-transfer  10 (4%) 1 (10%) 7 (70%) 2 (20%)   
Staff-related issues 4 (2%) 3 (75%) 3 (75%) 3 (75%)  2 (50%) 
Incorrect treatment 4 (2%)      
Patient injury  2 (1%)  1 (50%)    
Patient violence 1 <1%) 1 (100%) 1 (100%)  1 (100%)  




Online Appendix 1: Data extraction form  
 
ITEM RESPONSE 
Incident number  
Coder initials  
Eligible 
If no, do not complete rest of form and exclude 
Yes 
No 
Possible (requires second review) 
Type of transfer Into hospital 
Out of hospital 
Inter-unit / department / team 
Intra-unit / department / team 
Hospital to hospital 
Self-transfer  
Unknown 
Other [please describe]: 
Reason for transfer  
Incident classification  
Active failure(s)  
Latent condition(s)  
Was responsibility for the incident identified? If 
yes, provide details 
 
Staff actions taken as result of incident 
Include brief description 
Patient-facing actions (treatment) 
Documentation 
Communication with other staff 
Communication with patient / family 
Other [please describe]: 
Role of reporter in incident  
Patient / family involvement  
Patient wellbeing  
Evidence of individual learning  
Evidence of organisational / systems learning  
Does level of harm match the incident 
description? If no, explain 
 
Reflections on incident  
(sentence or short paragraph) 
 
Does this record require additional review?  





Online Appendix 2: Coding Manual  
 
The purpose of this coding manual is to provide detailed instructions on how to code staff 
incident reports relating to handover, transfer and discharge. Reviewers should avoid making 
assumptions about the incident, and use only the data explicitly reported in the incident report 





The unique ID assigned to each incident. 
 
Coder initials 
Initials of the person coding the incident. 
 
Eligible 
An eligible incident is one that explicitly relates to any type of care process (collect, assess, 
plan, supplement or follow-up/monitor or evaluation - https://jcpp.net/patient-care-process/) 
as part of a patient transfer (completed or planned), defined as the movement of a patient 
from one location to another. Self-transfer in the form of self-discharge were also eligible for 
inclusion. 
 
Type of transfer 
There are numerous types of transfer that a patient can go through: 
 
Type of transfer Example / description 
Into hospital A patient is admitted to a hospital ward from their home or 
in the community 
Out of hospital A patient is discharged home (with or without community 
care), or to a care home 
Inter-unit / department / 
team 
A patient is moved from one ward to another in the same 
hospital 
Intra-unit / department / 
team 
A patient is moved from a hospital bed to wheelchair or 
handover between day and night staff 
Hospital to hospital A patient is moved from one hospital to another, it is 
dependent on the perspective of the reporter (receiving or 
sending the patient) 
Self-transfer A patient expresses a wish to discharge themselves from 
hospital (irrespective of whether they followed through with 
it or not), whether or not staff were informed 
Unknown Where it is not clear what type of transfer the patient went 
through based on the data included in the incident report 
Other Any other type of transfer not listed above 
 
Reason for transfer 
This code attempts to determine whether a reason for the transfer was identified within the 
incident report. It is likely that the reason for the initial transfer is not identified within the 
incident report unless it directly contributes to the incident. Where the reason is not 
identified, it should be recorded as ‘unknown’. 
 
Incident classification 
This code is the type of incident that occurred, such as a patient fall, medication error, 
pressure sore, delayed discharge. All incidents should receive a single classification, which is 
the primary ‘reason’ for the incident being reported. Note that this may not match the incident 
type provided in the incident report system, and should instead be coded using details 
provided in the incident.  
 
Active failure(s) 
According to the Swiss-Cheese model of safety, Active failures are the unsafe acts committed 
by people who are in direct contact with the patient or system. They take a variety of forms: 
slips, lapses, fumbles, mistakes, and procedural violations. Failures have a direct and usually 
short-lived impact on the integrity of the defences. 
 
Latent condition(s) 
According to the Swiss-Cheese model of safety, Latent conditions are the inevitable “resident 
pathogens” within the system. They arise from decisions made by designers, builders, 
procedure writers, and top level management. Latent conditions have two kinds of adverse 
effect: they can translate into error provoking conditions within the local workplace (for 
example, time pressure, understaffing, inadequate equipment, fatigue, and inexperience) and 
they can create long-lasting holes or weaknesses in the defences (untrustworthy alarms and 
indicators, unworkable procedures, design and construction deficiencies, etc.). 
 
Was responsibility for the incident identified? 
In some cases, the incident reporter will attribute responsibility or even blame for the 
incident. This may be acknowledging that they themselves had made a mistake, another 
healthcare professional made a mistake or even the patient making a mistake. If responsibility 
is attributed, it is important to code who it was attributed to in this field, and any other 
relevant information not coded elsewhere, such as in the active failures or latent conditions 
field.  
 
This field is different to active failures and latent conditions; an active failure could be 
written in a passive tense without identifying responsibility, such as ‘patient not on correct 
mattress’. Whereas in some incidents responsibility may be attributed to the active failure, 
‘healthcare assistant did not place patient on the correct mattress’. This does not just apply to 
active failures, for example a latent condition (staffing issues) may have responsibility 
attributed at an organisational level, or not at all (or even to an individual).   
 
Staff actions taken as a result of the incident 
There are different types of actions that staff took as a result of an incident. These broadly 
include patient-facing actions that relate to treatment and immediate care of the patient (e.g. 
taking patient observations, applying a care plan, dressing a wound), documentation 
(reporting the incident cannot be classed as documentation), communication with other staff 
(e.g. informing others of the incident, requesting further information or actions to be taken), 
and communication with patient / family (e.g. apologising, explaining the incident, requesting 
information, providing education). 
 
Role of reporter in incident 
This is about what the reporter’s role was in the incident. Examples may include directly 
witnessing the incident, identifying an incident had occurred, causing the incident or having 
to deal with the outcomes of the incident. 
 
Patient or family/carer involvement 
This code is attempting to understand how the patient and/or family were involved in the 
incident beyond being the ‘recipient’. Types of involvement may include making staff aware 
of the incident, providing information about the incident, contributing to the incident through 
their own (non)actions. Reports with no patient or family involvement should be coded as 
‘none’, on the assumption that only information explicitly stated in the incident report is 
coded. It is possible for some repetition with the active failures code, and this is acceptable.  
Patient wellbeing 
The duty of candour legally requires the health service to inform and apologise to patients if 
there have been mistakes in their care that lead to significant harm, though there is no such 
duty of candour for lower levels of harm. The purpose of this coding category is to identify 
how the patient’s wellbeing has been taken into account as a result of the incident, including 
providing reassurance, apologising, demonstrating dignity or taking into account patient 
feelings. Note that there may be some crossover with the staff actions coding category. The 
purpose of having this as a discreet category is to identify where patient wellbeing has not 
been reported to be taken into account.  
 
Evidence of individual learning 
Evidence may exist in the form of reflections by the reporter about what they may do 
differently in the future. It is possible for there to be no evidence of individual learning, and 
reporting the incident is not evidence of critical reflection. If evidence is identified then 
further details should be provided within the response. 
 
Evidence of organisational / systems learning  
Evidence may exist in the form new barriers, defences or safeguards established to prevent a 
similar incident occurring in the future, or of attempting to understand the cause of the 
incident, such as through a team meeting. It is possible for there to be no evidence of 
organisational / systems learning, and reporting the incident is not evidence of this. If 
evidence is identified then further details should be provided within the response. Look out 
for mention of a RCA – this should be coded as evidence of organisational / systems learning. 
 
Does level of harm match the incident description? 
This code is trying to determine whether the level of harm reported is appropriate. It can be 
difficult to establish whether the harm is the result of the incident when a patient is being 
transferred. In these cases, it should be assumed that harm has occurred where the incident 
either caused new harm, or exacerbated existing harm. For example, a patient with a grade 
2 pressure ulcer that had not been diagnosed or documented before the transfer would have 
exacerbated the harm. In rare cases, the level of harm may not be reported.  The reviewer 
should assess the reasons for this on a case-by-case basis using the NHS criteria for 
reporting of harm (National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS): 
 
No harm  
 
Low: Any unexpected or unintended incident that required extra observation or 
minor treatment and caused minimal harm to one or more persons. 
 
Moderate: Any unexpected or unintended incident that resulted in further 
treatment, possible surgical intervention, cancelling of treatment, or transfer to 
another area, and which caused short-term harm to one or more persons. 
 
Severe: Any unexpected or unintended incident that caused permanent or long-term 
harm to one or more persons. 
 
Death: Any unexpected or unintended event that caused the death of one or more 
persons.  
 
Reflections on incident 
These are the reviewer’s own reflections on the incident, and are intended to be no more than 
a sentence or short paragraph summarising any key thoughts/views or reactions to the 
incident report. Reflections are intended to inform discussions amongst data analysts. 
Online Appendix 3: Inter-rater reliability  
 
 
Table 1: Inter-rater reliability between [author 1] (20% of incidents) and [authors 2,3, 4 





Variable Percent agreement  
(≥75% deemed acceptable) 
Scott’s Pi 
(≥0.6 deemed acceptable) 
Eligibility 91% 0.813  
Type of transfer 76% 0.517 
Reason for transfer 45% -0.103 
Hazard / nature of incident 83% 0.655 
Active failure 48% -0.034 
Latent condition 88% 0.759 
Who was involved 62% 0.241 
Role of staff 43% -0.138 
Role of patient / family 84% 0.690 
Level of harm 81% 0.621 
Actions taken 81% 0.621 





Table 2: Inclusion/exclusion agreement between [author 1] and [author 7; initials 
redacted for review] 
 
DF JS 
Case # Eligible (yes / no) Eligible (yes / no) Notes 
6 Yes  Yes   
8 No  Yes  Agreed to exclude 
75 No  No  Unwitnessed fall  
94 Yes  Yes   
102 Yes  Yes   
125 Yes  Yes   
133 Yes  Yes   
134 Yes  Yes   
138 Yes  Yes   
139 Yes  Yes   
163 Yes  Yes   
184 Yes  Yes   
190 Yes  Yes   
207 Yes  Yes   
251 Yes  Yes   
259 Yes  Yes   
282 Yes  Yes   
326 Yes  Yes   
358 Yes  Yes   
366 Yes  Yes   
 
Online appendix 4: Reasons for ineligibility of incident reports 
 
# Case  Notes JS 
1.  2 Not related to a patient transfer – patient fall with no involvement of staff OUT 
2.  8 Staff complaint about a relative’s behaviour OUT 
3.  10 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor OUT 
4.  11 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor OUT 
5.  14 Not related to a patient transfer - lost property of patient (NOT SAFETY INCIDENT) OUT 
6.  17 Not related to a patient transfer - patient handover sheet found in male toilet  OUT 
7.  21 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor OUT 
8.  27 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor OUT 
9.  38 Patient documentation found in disabled parking bays OUT 
10   39 Not related to a patient transfer –patient found in distress  
11   42 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor OUT 
12   55 Not related to a patient transfer – delayed review by registrar/senior medic  
13   65 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall   
14   66 Staff complaint about a member of staff OUT 
15   75 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor OUT 
16   79 Staff report of inadequate staffing levels – no patient-related transfer incident reported OUT 
17   84 Not related to a patient transfer - inappropriate patient behaviour  OUT 
18   85 Not related to a patient transfer - Doctor who processed a sample was not BGA 
(blood gas analysis trained) and processed under the log in of another Dr 
 
19   86 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall   
20   87 Staff report of inadequate staffing levels – no patient-related transfer incident reported  
21   88 Staff report of inadequate staffing levels – no patient-related transfer incident reported  
22   97 Not related to a patient transfer - no patient-related transfer incident reported  
23   99 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall   
24   103 Patient deceased  
25   113 Patient deceased  
26   114 Patient deceased  
27   115 Duplicate of case 229  
28   116 Duplicate of case 231  
29   117 Duplicate of case 235  
30   122 Duplicate of case 317  
31   127 Staff report of concerns about delays in booking ambulances – no patient-related 
transfer incident reported 
 
32   128 Staff report of concerns about delays in booking ambulances – no patient-related 
transfer incident reported 
 
33   129 Duplicate of case 372  
34   132 Staff report of inadequate staffing levels – no patient-related transfer incident reported OUT 
35   149 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor OUT 
36   150 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor OUT 
37   152 Staff concern about a staff member’s level of expertise OUT 
38   153 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor OUT 
39   161 Staff complaint about a relative’s behaviour  OUT 
40   166 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor OUT 
41   170 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor OUT 
42   171 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor OUT 
43   173 Not related to patient transfer – staff injury   
44   174 Staff complaint about a relative’s behaviour OUT 
45   185 Staff report of inadequate staffing levels – no patient-related transfer incident reported OUT 
46   187 Duplicate of case 120  
47   191 Staff report of inadequate staffing levels – no patient-related transfer incident reported OUT 
48   194 Duplicate of case 193 OUT 
49   196 Repeat of case 121  
50   200 Not related to a patient transfer – patient was out of hospital   
51   204 Duplicate of case 108  
52   207 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall  
53   208 Duplicate of case 110  
54   210 Repeat of case 111  
55   213 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor OUT 
56   215 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor OUT 
57   218 Staff report of inadequate staffing levels – no patient-related transfer incident reported OUT 
58   227 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor OUT 
59   234 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor  
60   236 Staff report of inadequate staffing levels – no patient-related transfer incident reported  
61   241 Duplicate of case 119  
62   243 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor OUT 
63   244 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor  
64   249 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor  
65   251 Staff incident (injury to staff member) – NO POTENTIAL FOR PATIENT HARM  
66   253 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor  
67   256 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor OUT 
68   258 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor OUT 
69   261 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor  
70   267 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor  
71   268 Not related to a patient transfer - Inappropriate patient behaviour OUT 
72   269 Staff report of inadequate staffing levels – no patient-related transfer incident reported OUT 
73   271 DATA PROTECTION ISSUE NOT A SAFETY ISSUE  
74   280 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor  
75   285 Staffing issue – scheduling problem with staff member OUT 
76   287 Staffing issue – refusal to help cover nurse re childcare issues OUT 
77   291 Not related to a patient transfer – delayed review by registrar/senior medic  
78   292 Not related to a patient transfer – Patient documentation found out of place  
79   300 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor OUT 
80   303 Duplicate of case 124  
81   305 Inappropriate patient behaviour – left ward with friend for cigarette – suspected 
smoking cannabis. Injury to security guard 
OUT 
82   306 Staff report of inadequate staffing levels – no patient-related transfer incident reported  
83   315 Staff report of inadequate staffing levels – no patient-related transfer incident reported OUT 
84   318 Not related to patient transfer – patient hidden and distressed OUT 
85   324 Staff report of inadequate staffing levels – no patient-related transfer incident reported OUT 
86   325 DATA PROTECTION ISSUE NOT A SAFETY ISSUE OUT 
87   327 Patient aggression – not transfer related OUT 
88   329 Administration issue – not related to patient transfer   
89   330 Staffing level concerns –NOT A PATIENT TRANSFER OUT 
90   331 Cleaning (HPV) of ward delayed – NOT A PATIENT TRANSFER OUT 
91   332 Bed not cleaned as per trust policy – NOT A PATIENT TRANSFER OUT 
92   341 Staff complaint about a member of staff  
93   350 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall, patient found on floor OUT 
94   354 Staff incident (injury to staff member) – NO POTENTIAL FOR PATIENT HARM OUT 
95   363 Duplicate of case 125  
96   371 Not related to a patient transfer – unwitnessed fall OUT 




Online appendix 5: Cross tabulations of clinical area and incident classification 
Clinical Area 












Pressure ulcer 44 22 24 11 101 
Falls 9 6 7 10 32 
Medication 12 9 7 3 31 
Documentation 6 8 9 6 29 
Delayed Transition 7 4 1 3 15 
Communication 2 2 6 5 15 
Device / equipment 8 2 2  12 
Infection control 4 3 1 3 11 
Potentially unsafe transition 6 3 2  11 
Patient self-transition  7 3  10 
Sub-optimal treatment   3 1 4 
Staff-related issues 4    4 
Patient injury 2    2 
Patient violence 1    1 
Overall 105 66 65 42 278 
 
 
Online appendix 6: Cross tabulations of type of transition and clinical area 
 








hospital Into hospital 
Self-









Older people 55 34 12 1 2   104 
Cardiology 33 13 8 1 5 6  66 
Orthopaedics 32 12 10 5 2 3 1 65 
Stroke 19 7 11 6    43 
Overall 139 66 41 13 9 9 1 278 
 
 
